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Section 1: Introduction 
Roaming is the term given in mobile telephony markets to the provision of continuity of service 
outside the area of the home network provider. In 2007, the EU introduced a Regulation to cap 
roaming charges. This measure was ostensibly temporary. Its purpose was to protect consumers 
from excessive prices and incurring large, unexpected bills - a phenomenon known as ‘bill 
shock’ (Horrigan and Satterwhite, 2010; Xavier, 2011) - while allowing competition in the 
provision of roaming services to develop.1 However, the anticipated developments in 
competition did not materialise: prices stayed at, or just below, the price caps. As a result, the 
provisions were renewed and eventually roaming charges were abolished entirely on June 17th, 
2017. 
This policy response was unusually strong. Less drastic interventions more in keeping with the 
predominant ‘information paradigm’ of EU consumer law (Micklitz, 2008) were available. 
Justifying the approach, the legislation described the characteristics of the roaming market as 
‘unique’ and the measures taken as ’exceptional’.2 Some took a dim view of this justification: 
“The underlying problem has yet to be formulated in the language of competition law economics 
[. . .] The delay is inexcusable, given the difficulty in bypassing such economic analysis” 
(Sutherland, 2008). Others questioned whether the Roaming Regulation was “a regulatory 
fallacy” and suggested it was “no substitute for functioning competition” (Knieps and 
                                                          
1 European Commission, 2006 
2Recital 13, Regulation (EC) No 717/2007. 
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Zenhausern, 2014). That such critiques were made is not particularly surprising given the policy 
was not a response to a classic market failure of asymmetric information, market power, or 
externalities.  
The application of behavioural research to internal market regulation has received much attention 
in recent years from within the EU Commission (e.g. van Bavel et al. 2013) and the academic 
community (e.g. Faure and Luth, 2011; Burgess 2012; Franck and Purnhagen 2014; Purnhagen 
2015; Sibony and Alemanno 2015). Van Boom (2011) applied behavioural research to analyse 
issues of price intransparency with the EU consumer law framework. In a similar vein, 
Trzaskowki (2011) discussed whether the ‘average consumer test’ used by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) is flexible enough to incorporate insights from decision-making 
research to arrive at a more evidence-based normative standard. Behavioural insights have been 
used sporadically, and perhaps implicitly, in EU competition cases. The well-documented 
stickiness of default options (e.g. Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Madrian & Shea, 2001) was a 
factor in the CJEU ruling that compelled Microsoft to offer users an active choice of internet 
browser (Case T-201/04).3 In a recent labelling case, the average consumer benchmark in the 
Food Information Regulation interpreted by the CJEU in line with findings from behavioural 
science rather than case law (Purnhagen and Schebesta, 2016, p. 595). Empirical research has 
begun to test suppositions of the CJEU in relation to the abilities of the ‘average consumer’. In 
the Mars case4, it was alleged that the company had engaged in misleading advertising when 
they displayed an oversized indication of the extra volume on the package The CJEU ruled that a 
‘reasonable observant and circumspect’ average consumer would not be misled. An experimental 
                                                          
3 Research on defaults similarly informed the decision to ban pre-ticked boxes in the EU Consumer Rights Directive 
(Directive 2011/83/EU).   
4 Verein gegen Unwesen in Handel und Gewerbe Köln e.V. v Mars GmbH (C-470/93) [1995] E.C.R. I-1923. 
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test later provided evidence that consumers were prone to ‘anchor’ on the visual size of the 
display and hence overestimate the extra volume on offer (Purnhagen and van Herpen, 2017). 
Less attention has been afforded to the potential benefits of applying behavioural industrial 
organisation (hereafter BIO) within the internal market.5 BIO maintains the rigour and 
mathematical tractability of classic industrial organisation while incorporating departures from 
rational behaviour, such as loss aversion or limited attention. In many markets BIO models offer 
greater predictive power of market outcomes, and explain phenomena that are anomalies under 
the standard model. For instance, they explain that current accounts have high overdraft fees 
because a subset of consumers ignore this feature completely, so it is optimal to set a high price. 
(Armstrong and Vickers, 2012). Mobile phone consumers underestimate the variance of their 
usage - firms respond by charging a price that is increasing in minutes of calling (Grubb, 2009). 
Brown et al. (2012) find films that open without reviews earn more at the box office than 
reviewed movies of similar (invariably very low) quality. The absence of a review would be a 
clear signal of low quality to a rational consumer. Firms increase demand by taking advantage of 
consumers’ failure to reason strategically.    
This paper applies behavioural research to the roaming regulation. Two contributions are made 
to the nascent literature. The first is to argue against the roaming market being ‘unique’.  Though 
the supply-side dynamic between the wholesale and retail roaming markets was certainly unusual 
(Infante and Vallejo, 2012), the demand side had characteristics common to many markets, such 
as credit cards. These commonalities will be highlighted. Specifically, the case will be made that 
three well-documented behavioural biases – namely inattention, overconfidence and present bias 
                                                          
5 Papers that examine implications of behavioural economics in general on competition policy include Bennett et al. 
(2010) and Stucke (2010) 
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(self-control problems) – contributed to the inelastic demand for roaming services and were 
plausible causal factors in ‘bill shock’. It is posited that the Roaming Regulation should be 
considered a ‘behaviourally aligned’ intervention, defined by an EU Commission taxonomy as 
“initiatives that, at least a posteriori, can be found to be aligned to behavioural evidence” 
(Lourenco et al., 2016).  
The second contribution and main purpose of this paper is to use the Roaming Regulation as a 
case study to illustrate the potential benefits of applying BIO models to competition policy 
issues. Contrary to predictions under the standard model, BIO models show that more sellers in a 
market does not necessarily benefit consumers, and that regulations to enhance consumer 
protection may also boost competition. An analysis of two problems that arose during the 
lifecycle of the Roaming Regulation will demonstrate the potential usefulness of BIO models to 
policymakers. Critiques of the Roaming Regulation, and proposed alternative measures, will also 
be analysed within this framework.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides context by outlining regulatory developments 
in the roaming market. Section 3 briefly describes some of the behavioural biases 
telecommunications consumers display that plausibly contributed to bill shock. Section 4 
compares the standard model of competition with BIO models that incorporate behavioural 
biases. How firm actions designed to exploit consumer biases affects demand substitutability, 
and by deduction market power, is then discussed. Two key junctures in the policy lifespan of 
the Roaming Regulation are analysed in Section 5 to demonstrate the potential benefits of BIO 
models. The case is made that had the EU Commission related their empirical findings on the 
malfunctioning of roaming markets to the appropriate BIO model, it wold have simplified the 
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subsequent task of defending the Roaming Regulation as an appropriate and proportionate policy 
measure. Section 6 briefly discusses policy implications and concludes. 
It is important to note at the outset that this paper is agnostic on whether the Roaming Regulation 
in its current form is the optimal policy intervention to address bill-shock. That judgement 
requires a welfare analysis beyond the scope of this paper.6 However, a firm view is taken on the 
need to consider behavioural evidence to reach an informed decision about what such an 
intervention would look like. 
Section 2:  A Brief History of Roaming Charges 
This section is intended to provide necessary context for the following sections rather than 
provide a comprehensive overview of the evolution of regulation in roaming markets. For a more 
detailed discussion see Infante and Vallejo (2012). The roaming market, in simplified terms, 
worked as follows: Domestic operators paid a wholesale charge to foreign operators for 
providing continuity of service. The domestic provider then charged its customers for using 
roaming services. This was the retail charge. The dynamics of this market are unusual. A firm 
lowering its price at the wholesale level would not necessarily lead to an increase in demand: 
“The demand for wholesale international roaming services stems from the demand on the retail 
level, and is therefore linked to the travel pattern of the customers at the retail level”. 7 
Additionally, choice of wholesale partner was often not based on price but on reciprocation.  
                                                          
6 Though it is not the focus of this paper, it should be noted that fears of a large ‘waterbed’ effect (Genakos and 
Valletti, 2011) following price caps on roaming services have not (yet) materialised (BEREC, 2010, cited in Falch 
and Tadayoni, 2014), suggesting that high prices were not a reflection of high costs but rather a lack of competition. 
This is reminiscent of the consumer savings accruing after the CARD Act (Agarwal, 2015), where a waterbed effect 
was predicted by opponents to the legislation but not subsequently observed. 
7 European Regulators Group (2005) ERG COMMON POSITION ON THE COORDINATED ANALYSIS OF 
THE MARKETS FOR WHOLESALE INTERNATIONAL ROAMING, Paragraph 59. 
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International roaming charges were first brought to the attention of the EU Commission in 1996 
by mobile operators concerned that arrangements at the wholesale level between Mobile 
Network Operators were in violation of EU competition rules. Exemptions were granted subject 
to the introduction of non-discriminatory wholesale pricing.8 A sector inquiry covering national 
and international roaming services was ordered in 1999 following complaints about persistently 
high prices.9 This led to the Commission opening proceedings alleging abuse of a dominant 
position by some mobile operators in the United Kingdom and Germany, but the case was later 
closed without penalties being imposed. International roaming was later recognized as an issue 
for potential ex-ante regulation at the time of the adoption of the 2002 regulatory package for 
electronic communications,10 where companies were found to be dominant in the relevant 
market.   
The first Roaming Regulation (Roaming I) was enacted in 200711 due to the perceived 
inadequacy of the 2002 regulatory tools to tackle the problem of high roaming charges. It 
introduced wholesale and retail caps (called Eurotariffs) for incoming and outgoing calls. To 
increase price transparency, it was mandated that customers receive a free text message when 
travelling with information about roaming charges. A review in 2009 led to Roaming II. Price 
caps were lowered for voice calls to reduce the gap between wholesale and retail prices. 
Additionally, SMS prices (retail and wholesale) and data services (wholesale only) were 
                                                          
8 European Commission XXVIth report on Competiton Policy. Brussels: EC (1996) 
9 DG COMP, 2000. Accessed online 2nd May 2017. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/telecommunications/archive/inquiries/roaming/working_document_on_initia
l_results.pdf 
10 through the identification of the wholesale national market for international roaming on public mobile networks in 
the Commission's Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on Relevant Product and Service Markets within the 
electronic communications sector. 
11 Council Regulation (EC) No 717/2007 on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community 
and amending Directive 2002/21/EC L-171/32 
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regulated. A consumer protection measure against bill shock was introduced too: on reaching a 
predefined limit (€50 excl. VAT by default), the operator was obliged to notify the customer, at 
which point they could decide whether to continue spending money on data services.  
The Roaming Regulation was recast once more in 201212 as competition had failed to bring 
about the envisaged benefits, especially for data services (BEREC, 2012). Referring to data 
provided by the national regulatory authorities, Recital 22 of the 2012 Regulation stated that: 
“retail and wholesale roaming prices are still much higher than domestic prices and continue to 
cluster at or close to the limits set by Regulation (EC) No 717/2007, with only limited 
competition below these limits”. Price caps were lowered accordingly. It also introduced the 
concept of roaming unbundling, which separated the sale of roaming services from the rest of the 
retail package. Article 4 (2) asserted that “Roaming customers shall have the right to switch 
roaming provider at any time. Where a roaming customer chooses to switch roaming provider, 
the switch shall be carried out without undue delay”. Article 4 (4) outlined the responsibility of 
domestic providers to inform customers about switching roaming provider. It was envisaged that 
the technical provisions for unbundling would take time to implement. This never occurred 
however, because in September 2013, Commissioner Neelie Kroes announced plans to introduce 
“Roam Like at Home (RLAH)” whereby operators charge the same price for roaming services 
within the EEA as for domestic mobile services. This was supported immediately by the 
European Parliament, but implementation was delayed by concerns over a painful transition for 
the telecoms industry by the Council of the European Union (Spruytte et al., 2017). In November 
2015 the legislation was finalised and in June 2017 RLAH came into effect.  
                                                          
12 REGULATION (EU) No 531/2012 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 June 
2012 on roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (recast) 
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Section 3: Behavioural Biases in Telecoms Markets 
Telecoms consumers often display behavioural biases such as inattention, overconfidence and 
time inconsistent preferences (see Lunn, 2013 for a detailed discussion). The express political 
motivation of the Roaming Regulation was to eradicate ‘bill shock’. This section outlines how 
these phenomena - especially in combination - plausibly increase the likelihood of experiencing 
bill shock. Parallels are drawn throughout to similar markets where these biases have been 
documented.   
3.1 Inattention 
That humans are boundedly rational decision makers means decisions must be arrived at by a 
process other than full optimisation (Simon, 1955). When faced with ‘too-much information’, 
individuals struggle to evaluate choices accurately (Jacoby 1984; Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; 
Schwartz, 2004; Scheibehenne et al., 2010). A wealth of evidence suggests that individuals 
simplify the task for themselves and ‘satisfice’ by focusing on a subset of the information and 
using heuristics or rules of thumb (Iyengar,  Huberman and Jiang, 2004) to find an option that is 
“good enough”. Although this may be a sound strategy with no adverse consequences 
(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999), in some circumstances satisficing results in inattention to 
information that matters.13 
Inattention is evident in a wide range of domains proposed and has been proposed as one of the 
unifying themes of behavioural economics (Gaibaix, 2017). For example, left digit bias when 
evaluating the mileage of second hand cars (Lacetera, Pope, and Sydnor, 2012) and inattention to 
future weather conditions when buying a car (Busse et al., 2015); inattention in loan choice to 
                                                          
13 Inattention can occur without information overload but the opposite is rarely the case. 
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features not made salient (Lunn et al., 2016); inattention to shipping costs on eBay (Brown, 
Hossain and Morgan, 2010); and retail investors are often inattentive to fee information that has 
a larger bearing on expected returns than past performance information that is often attended to 
instead (Wilcox, 2003; Husser and Wirth, 2014).  
 
Inattention to hidden fees on credit cards is perhaps the most well-researched example for 
consumer products that, like mobile phones, involve standard contract terms. Consumers who 
take out new credit cards incur higher rates of fees than existing customers, with one study 
estimating that fee expenditure in the U.S. market fell by 75% over the first three years of an 
account (Agarwal et al., 2008). Initial inattention that is corrected by incurring fees is the 
simplest explanation for this finding, although the exact mechanism cannot be stated with 
certainty, 14 The U.S CARD Act banned or placed limits on many of the fees that consumers 
were inattentive to. A comparison of borrowing costs before and after its introduction found no 
evidence of waterbed effects and estimated consumer savings at $12Bn per year (Agarwal et al., 
2015). 
 
A standard mobile phone contract is highly complex (Bar-Gill and Stone, 2009). It has at least 
six important attributes15 apart from terms and conditions related to roaming. Survey evidence 
(Eurobarometer, 2006) suggested that consumers were inattentive to roaming charges in their 
‘satisficing’ between service providers. Survey by national regulators (ComReg, 2005) and the 
                                                          
14 Gathergood et al. (2018) show that learning effects are it is wholly due to consumers switching to automatic 
payments – thereby avoiding the need to remember to repay altogether. 
15 the price of own network calls and texts, other network calls and texts, the data allowance and the  penalty charges 
for exceeding the allowance, the number of free calls and texts, and the price of  off-peak rates (e.g.  free weekend 
calls etc.) A bill pay customer would have to estimate the probability of exceeding multiple allowances for different 
types of calls and texts. 
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European Commission (2006) recorded low levels of knowledge on roaming charges too (less 
than one third said they knew their roaming charges). These estimates were self-reported and 
hence likely constitute an upper bound on the true proportion. Inattention to roaming charges 
leaves one exposed to a higher probability of bill shock, especially when individuals are unlikely 
to be Bayesian thinkers who are suspicious of what might be in the fine print (e.g. see Jin, Luca, 
and Martin, 2017).  
 
3.2 Overconfidence 
Two types of overconfidence are relevant to the incidence of bill shock. The first is over 
optimism about one’s abilities or likely outcomes relative to the general population (Dunning, 
2004). This tendency blunts the effectiveness of information disclosure about the average 
likelihood of an event occurring in changing individual behaviour. Bar-Gill and Ferrari (2010) 
discuss how attribute disclosures are rarely helpful to consumers who mispredict usage. They 
argue that “product-use” disclosures, such as the average roaming charges incurred, would be 
better, especially if it was given at the individual (or perhaps peer group) level to counteract the 
‘better-than-average’ effect.  
The second form of overconfidence relates to the range of potential outcomes individuals 
consider possible. Subjective confidence intervals are often constructed too narrowly, thus 
underestimating the probability of outcomes far from their expected mean. This is called 
miscalibration. Firms exploit this miscalibration by convex price curves for usage (Grubb, 2009). 
Both types of overconfidence have been recorded in market settings (Dellavigna, 2009) for credit 
cards and gym memberships. Research in telecommunications has shown that miscalibration 
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causes individuals to systematically choose the wrong calling plans, meaning high charges for 
exceeding usage allowances are often incurred (Grubb, 2009; Grubb and Osborne, 2015). 
Overconfidence may be robust to correction through experience and feedback due to attribution 
bias, namely the tendency to ascribe negative outcomes to external circumstances and positive 
outcomes to one’s own ability. Alternatively, behaviour change may occur but then be followed 
by a steady regression to prior habits. For example, learning to avoid additional fees in credit 
card markets is often temporary (Agarwal et al., 2008) unless consumers switch to automatic 
payments (Gathergood et al., 2017).  Overconfidence and miscalibration are plausible 
explanations for ‘bill shock’ in roaming charges. And attribution bias may explain why ‘bill 
shock’ did not stimulate switching behaviour – ascribing the high bill to unavoidable external 
circumstances would dampen down the subjective probability of a repeat occurrence and thus the 
incentive to switch.  
 
3.3 Present Bias (Self-Control Problems) 
Hyperbolic discounting – the empirical finding that present consumption is valued 
disproportionately highly relative to the future consumption - means people often display time‐
inconsistent preferences (Malhotra, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2002). Beliefs about future 
self-control are often overly optimistic; the present self envisages an ascetic future self, but when 
the future arrives, it is the voluptuary present self making the decisions. As a result, relative to 
prior beliefs about usage, consumers may overconsume services which provide instant 
gratification at a future cost (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006; Meier and Sprenger, 2010). 
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Ausubel (1991) in an influential paper first argued that consistently high profits in the credit card 
industry waere caused by consumers expecting not to borrow on their cards, but then doing so.   
It has been noted that the potential scale of the self-control problem is particularly acute in 
telecommunications, given the broad range of social and entertainment platforms, such as 
Facebook and Reddit, and addictive activities, such as gambling and viewing pornography, the 
device allows access to (Lunn, 2013). Present bias potentially amplifies the potential consumer 
detriment of high roaming charges due to the “buy now, pay later” nature of roaming services. 
Taken in conjunction with inattention to roaming charges and/or overconfidence about avoiding 
incurring these charges, present biased consumers may be more likely to experience bill shock.16 
Section 4: The Standard Model of Competition vs. BIO Models  
In the standard model of competition, firms are profit maximising and individuals are rational 
agents who maximise utility. BIO models maintain the profit-maximising assumption on the firm 
side but incorporate behavioural biases on the consumer side, such as self-control problems, loss 
aversion, inattention, overconfidence and confusion (see Grubb (2015) for reviews of this 
literature). The analytical core becomes the interaction between individual psychology and 
market competition (Barr et al., 2008). Firms have the choice to attenuate consumer biases or 
exploit them. The nature of the product often determines which choice the seller makes. Barr et 
al. (2008) illustrate this point using the example of exponential growth bias, the tendency to 
underestimate the effects of compound interest (Stango and Zinman, 2009). A company selling 
savings accounts will aim to rid consumers of this bias; a credit card company will not.  
                                                          
16 An extreme example is the British man who incurred a bill of £31,500 mobile phone after downloading an episode of his 
favourite TV show (Prison Break) while on holidays in Portugal. After a legal challenge the bill was reduced to £229 
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Not all consumers are alike however. Some may be ‘sophisticated’ in the sense that they behave 
like the archetype ‘rational agent’ of neoclassical economics. Others may be ‘biased’ and display 
some of the behavioural tendencies outlined in Section 3. Competition works best when even a 
subset of consumers being sophisticated means all consumers receive a better deal.  This often 
occurs in markets for simple goods that have only have one or two features, e.g. taste in the case 
of an apple, or perhaps the betting odds in a bookmaker. In these markets, the circumspection of 
even a few sophisticated consumers ensures a better deal must be offered to all, including the 
biased ones. This is called a search externality.17 But if the product has multiple attributes, some 
of which may be non-salient, the situation is different. Goods or services that contain standard 
contract terms fall into this category. Here an opportunity arises for the producer to divide 
consumers and prosper (Morwitz et al., 1998; Greenleaf et al., 2015). 
When some consumers are sophisticated but others inattentive to add-on fees18, BIO models 
show that the optimal firm response is to place a high mark-up on the hidden, or ‘shrouded’ 
component of the product and set the base price for the visible product below marginal cost  
(Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Heidhues et al., 2016). Sophisticated consumers find a way to avoid 
this hidden cost. For instance, going to a hotel, they will take public transport rather than incur 
the parking charges at the destination, which they expect to be high. To avoid roaming charges, 
they may buy a SIM card in the visited country. The biased consumers, in contrast, naively 
choose whichever product has the lowest visible price and subsequently incur the hidden add-on 
charges. In this situation, sophisticated consumers may be cross-subsidized by biased consumers. 
                                                          
17 Kay (2004) uses the analogy of the queues at a shopping market to explain the intuition. All shoppers need not 
actively search for the shortest queue. As long as a few do so, the queues will be of roughly equal length and all will 
benefit. 
18 Inattention to add on fees may be due to naïve overconfidence in avoiding these fees (Bubb and Kaufman, 2013) 
or simply not noticing them in the fine print (Brown et al., 2010) 
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Instead of heterogeneity leading to a positive search externality, what transpires is a negative 
‘rip-off externality’ (Armstrong, 2015).  
In addition to distributional effects, hidden fees interacts with consumer heterogeneity to create 
distortions in the efficiency of the market. Naïve consumers who are inattentive to roaming 
charges will incur more charges than they would under full information. To take advantage of 
this naivety, companies set these prices high. For those who are attentive to roaming charges, 
Heidheus and Koszegi (2018) note: “faced with these high roaming fees when abroad, consumers 
have an incentive to reduce their amount of calling, generating an inefficiency” (pg 19). This 
pattern of usage is reflected in the survey reports that many people incurred bill shock and others 
did not use their phones on holiday at all. Others expend socially wasteful effort in finding ways 
to avoid add-on costs, such as buying a foreign SIMs in their destination.  
Within the standard model, when evidence of poor consumer outcomes arises, the regulatory 
response is often to promote greater competition within the market place. The example of an 
‘honest firm’ entering a market in Gaibaix and Laibson (2006) is instructive in this regard. They 
demonstrate that an honest strategy is a losing one, because debiased consumers prefer to avail of 
the lower base price offered by the dishonest firm and avoid the hidden fees. Therefore 
increasing the number of competitors in the market may do little but intensify efforts to exploit 
the biased consumers’ inattention to shrouded attributes. Other BIO models (Spiegler, 2006; 
Gabaix et al., 2016) also find that more sellers does not necessarily improve outcomes for 
consumers. Carlin (2009) derives a model whereby firms make both a pricing decision and a 
complexity decision, which determines how easy it is to compare prices (a combination of low 
price and low complexity would be a strategy to attract new customers). As the number of firms 
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increases, so too does the probability of choosing the high complexity option. Similar theoretical 
results are reported by Chioveanu and Zhou (2013).  
Of direct relevance to the Roaming Regulation is how standard and BIO models predict price 
caps impact on welfare. A strong argument under the standard framework is that price caps are 
welfare reducing (Fershtman and Fishman, 1994; Armstrong et al., 2009). In these models, 
consumers observe the price of a single firm, but can pay a search cost to become informed about 
the prices of other firms. The introduction of a price cap reduces price dispersion and therefore 
reduces consumers’ incentive to become informed.  If consumers are not inclined to search for 
alternatives, competitive pressure on firms lessens. The decrease in competition leads to an 
increase in the average price consumers pay. Through this mechanism, a well-intentioned 
consumer protection measure may backfire and reduce welfare. The opposite is the case in the 
BIO model of Heidheus, Johnen and Koszegi (2018). In this model consumers have limited 
attention. This means there is a trade-off between fully understanding the offer of one firm and 
comparing offers between firms.  Regulating the additional price or secondary feature of a 
product increases welfare through two channels. First, it limits consumer harm by hidden 
features. Second, it frees consumers to devote more attention to comparing products rather than 
trying to understand the minutiae of a single product to avoid price gouging. Regulation has a 
liberating effect on consumers and hence enhances competition, and there may be positive 
externalities for competition in other markets too. The authors note that the results are not licence 
to endorse indiscriminate regulation; pro-competitive effects must be balanced against classical 
concerns regarding regulation.  
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4.2 Behavioural Components of Demand Substitutability 
Within the acquis of EU competition law, the three competitive constraints are demand 
substitutability, supply substitutability, and potential competition (Commission Notice on 
Definition of the Relevant Market, 97/C-372/03) Of these, the former is the most important: 
“demand substitution constitutes the most immediate and effective disciplinary force on the 
suppliers of a given product” (para 13). There are two sides to effective demand substitution. The 
availability of substitutes is the first. Leaving aside the difficulties delineating markets,19 it is 
usually relatively straightforward to ascertain whether substitutes are available. The other side of 
the coin is that - conditional on substitutes existing - consumers must be able to spot the best 
deal. In the classical model this is assumed to be the case. But empirical evidence shows such 
discernment cannot be taken for granted. In the field, consumers often fail to choose the best 
price for homogenous goods (Grubb, 2015), switch to more expensive options (Wilson and Price, 
2010) or choose strictly dominated options (Bhargava et al., 2017). When product features such 
as complexity or hidden fees interact with consumer dispositions such as inattention, the result is 
often to weaken the degree of demand substitutability.  
Effective demand substitutability is important in its own right, but within EU competition its 
absence has a greater significance – it is a codified signal of a firm in a dominant position. The 
Commission Notice on Enforcement priorities notes that firms in a dominant position are free to 
act independently rather than having their choices constrained by genuine competitive pressure: 
“This notion of independence is related to the degree of competitive constraint exerted on the 
undertaking in question. Dominance entails that these competitive constraints are not sufficiently 
                                                          
19 For example, are bananas and apples substitutes? See Chiquita Bananas. - Case 27/76. 
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effective and hence that the undertaking in question enjoys substantial market power over a 
period of time” (para 10). It follows that absent or weak demand substitutability leads to 
dominance being more likely. The Commission notes that dominance is rare below a market 
share of 40 % in the relevant market, but that exceptional cases based on the market structure 
may occur. (para 14). As noted in the previous section, within the BIO literature it is understood 
that firms may benefit from intentional obfuscation under certain circumstances. If this stymies 
consumers’ ability to compare offers and choose the best deal, genuine competition may be 
illusory. Bar-Gill (2009) makes this point in relation to the subprime mortgage market. The 
complex fee structure made direct comparisons extremely difficult – thus, the market seemed 
competitive by normal metrics of concentration but lenders in essence operated local 
monopolies.  
Strict quantitative measures such as the SSNIP (small but significant non-transitory increase in 
prices) test allow for an objective view of the degree of market dominance to be ascertained. 
That the definition of dominance is predicated on demand substitutability, which in turn depends 
on consumer capabilities to spot the best deal, raises the question of whether quantitative tests to 
measure this aspect of the market should be used in a more systematic way. Experimental tests, 
both online and in the laboratory, are growing in popularity amongst regulators as a way to 
measure consumer capability to judge product quality. They offer a way to cleanly identify the 
factors that lead to poor decision making, and a way to pre-test the effectiveness of potential 
interventions (Lunn and Robertson, 2018). For example, Bhargava et al. (2017) found that 
consumers did not understand the trade-off between premium and excess in health insurance; 
dominated options were often chosen as a result. Simple worked examples greatly reduced the 
incidence of mistaken choices. Lunn and Bohacek (2017) pre-tested a regulatory intervention for 
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an ‘Estimated Annual Bill’ on electricity offers and found its presence greatly reduced the 
incidence of mistakes and reduced the attractiveness of arguably misleading ‘discount offers’. 
Financial consumer protection bodies within financial regulation are increasingly turning to 
experimental tests to inform judgments of where intervention is necessary too (for example, see 
FCA, 2016). Where there are clear indicators of poor consumer outcomes without evidence of a 
classic market failure, systematic experimental tests of consumer capability may inform 
judgments of whether intervention is necessary, and if so what form it should take. 
Section 5: A BIO Perspective on the Roaming Regulation 
The previous section underscored the importance of consumer capability in determining firm 
behaviour within BIO models and how this may inform perspectives on market power. To 
demonstrate the potential benefits of incorporating BIO into the policy cycle more generally, two 
obstacles that arose in the process of tackling high roaming charges are described in this section. 
In each case, it will be demonstrated that the predictions of BIO models, had they been readily 
available and consulted, would have made the validity of the Roaming Regulation as a market 
intervention more readily apparent.  
5.1: A Policy Implementation Problem 
International roaming was recognised as an issue for potential ex-ante regulation at the time of 
the adoption of the 2002 regulatory package for electronic communications,20  a toolkit to ensure 
effective competition in telecommunications. In 2005 the issue of high roaming charges at the 
retail level was raised.21 This was the precursor for the introduction of the Roaming Regulation 
                                                          
20 Through the identification of the wholesale national market for international roaming on public mobile networks 
in the Commission's Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on Relevant Product and Service Markets within the 
electronic communications sector. 
21 European Regulators Group (2005) 
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in 2007. High wholesale charges, high retail mark-ups, a failure to pass on wholesale savings to 
retail customers, and a lack of clear information on the part of consumers about roaming charges 
were all proposed as partial explanations for these high retail charges. Missing from this list was 
‘dominance on a retail market', as there were clearly a high number of competitors. This was a 
puzzle under the standard framework. Determined to proceed - if not through the 2002 measures 
then around them – it was asserted that “the retail and wholesale roaming markets exhibit unique 
characteristics which justify exceptional measures going beyond the mechanisms otherwise 
available under the 2002 regulatory framework.”22  
However, as outlined in Section 4, BIO models predict high prices being robust to the presence 
of many competitors when consumers display biases such as inattention and overconfidence and 
the product has multiple attributes. In a counterfactual scenario where BIO models were 
consulted during the formulation of a regulatory toolkit, legislators would have had a stronger 
case to preserve discretion over the circumstances in which ex-ante regulation was justified. For 
a policymaker concerned that market dynamics are eroding consumer surplus, market dominance 
may be a sufficient condition for regulatory intervention, but BIO models show it may not be a 
necessary one. 
5.2: A Policy Enforcement Problem 
The Roaming Regulation was opposed by mobile phone operators, who felt the EU Commission 
was going on a politically-motivated solo run with little concern for whether the precise criteria 
for legislative action at the EU level were met (Sutherland, 2008). Some legal academics agreed 
                                                          
22 Recital 13, REGULATION (EC) No 717/2007 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 27 June 2007 on roaming on public mobile telephone networks within the Community and amending Directive 
2002/21/EC 
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that the EU had gone beyond its competence in capping retail roaming services (Brenncke, 
2008). A court case was taken in Britain by four large mobile operators to challenge the validity 
of the Roaming Regulation. The claimants challenged the validity of the Roaming Regulation on 
three grounds, namely that its legal basis was inadequate, it was disproportionate and it breached 
the principle of subsidiarity. The second claim is direct relevance to the central premise of this 
paper. The case was referred to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.23  An 
analysis of the ECJ’s verdict highlights a potentially troubling juxtaposition: a clear empirical 
need for a Roaming Regulation and no apparent theoretical basis for one.  
The principle of proportionality essentially means that measures implemented through 
Community law provisions must be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued 
and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them.24  Community legislature is allowed 
broad discretion in its choice of measure25 but this choice must nonetheless be based on 
objective criteria.26  The claimants argued that the chosen measure went beyond what was 
necessary. Paragraph 61 of the verdict summarises this position:  
“It is argued that said measure goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective 
pursued, given the competitive nature of retail markets. A less intrusive and more 
proportionate approach would have been to regulate wholesale charges only, while 
allowing competition in retail markets to bring retail markets down in the normal way, 
according to the rules of supply and demand”.  
                                                          
23 Case C-58/08, Vodafone Ltd and Others v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 
Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 8 June 2010 
24 ibid, para 51 
25 ibid, para 52 
26 Ibid, para 53 
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The claimant’s argument is to maintain the status quo. Justifying the departure from it, the 
judgment refers to the poor pass through rate of wholesale charge reductions to the retail level 
“owing to the absence of incentives for that to happen” 27 and “no competitive pressure on 
operators to pass on that reduction”28. The supporting evidence for this assertion is observational 
in nature: “experience has shown that a reduction in wholesale charges did not necessarily lead 
to a reduction in retail charges”.29 Taken in isolation, this is not a particularly compelling 
argument on which to base regulation - many explanations, for instance changes in technology, 
could be forwarded for why the future will be unlike the past.  
Generally, empirical observations carry more weight when they cohere with predictions from a 
theoretical model that captures the essential features of the system in question. Many of the BIO 
models outlined above predict that prices will not be reduced by market forces when the product 
is complex and consumers have behavioural biases. Notably, the verdict alludes to an interaction 
between the nature of the product and behavioural factors in justifying the need for controls on 
retail prices:  
“competition at retail level took place mainly in terms of the complete retail package and, 
for the majority of consumers, roaming was only a small part of that package and 
accordingly not a critical consideration when they choose or change their provider”.30 
The meaning of the term “not a critical consideration” in this context is ambiguous. It could 
mean that roaming charges were noticed but underweighted in the decision of which package to 
choose. If this is the case, the implication might be that incurring high roaming charges is 
                                                          
27 Ibid, para 62 
28 Ibid, para 63 
29 Ibid, para 63 
30 Ibid, para 64 
24 
 
evidence of overconfidence. If instead ‘not a critical consideration’ is a euphemism for ‘went 
unnoticed’ then inattention is the cognitive bias at the root of the bill shock problem. Consumers 
may of course be heterogeneous in the bias they display which leads them to underweight 
roaming charges in the decision process. The policy implication may depend on which bias is 
most prevalent. However, without incorporating a model of competition that accounts for these 
biases, it is difficult to draw any policy implications without appearing to act in a somewhat ad-
hoc fashion. This was the criticism levelled at the EU Commission from the beginning. 
An analysis of the verdict supports the claim that the roaming regulation should be considered a 
behaviourally aligned intervention. The evidence cited to defend its validity has behavioural 
foundations in two regards. First, the observed lack of incentives to pass on savings to 
consumers, despite numerous competitors in the market, supports the predictions of BIO models 
but is an anomaly within the confines of the standard model. Second, the suggestion that the root 
of the roaming charges problem was the complexity of the retail product is evidence of a 
consumer bias. The verdict does not elaborate on how firms may have responded to this bias. 
Taking the predictions of BIO models in conjunction with widely observed ‘bill shock’, it is 
plausible that they exploited it. It can also be argued that the verdict highlights the benefits of 
incorporating BIO models into the policymaking process more generally. There is evident 
tension between the orthodoxy that the normal process of supply and demand should improve 
consumer welfare and the empirical evidence that it did not and would not.  
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5.3: Proposed Alternatives to Roaming 
Mobile number portability (MNP) enables mobile telephone users to retain their mobile 
telephone numbers when changing from one mobile network carrier to another. It enhances 
competition by reducing switching costs (Klemperer, 1995) though its positive welfare effects 
are not unanimously accepted (Buehler & Haucap, 2004). Carrier portability is a similar concept 
- it means that customers would have the right to switch mobile phone providers at any time. It is 
very similar to the unbundling initiative in the 2012 recasting of the Roaming Regulation and has 
been proposed as a solution to roaming charges as it would address the crux of the issue:  
                  “As soon as consumers are free to choose any contract for mobile communications 
originating or received in the visited country, they are no longer forced into contractual relations 
with the home carrier or alternative roaming providers.” (Knieps and Zenhausern, 2014, pg 76). 
Considered to be a necessary and sufficient measure to bring about genuine competition in 
roaming markets, and made feasible by technological advances such as ‘soft SIMs’ that require 
no hardware, carrier portability requires consumers to have SIM unlocked handsets. At present 
SIM-lock phones are popular. They enable providers to offer subsidised handsets, which is a 
widespread practice in many countries (Díaz-Pinés 2010) as a tool for gaining and retaining 
market share (OECD, 2013). Attempts to ban this bundling have failed.31 Consumer choice is 
proposed as the means of resolving the tension between what carrier portability requires and 
what the market may offer:  
              “Consumers interested in changing carriers in guest countries should have the 
possibility to do so, whereas consumers interested in subsidised mobile handsets with low 
                                                          
31In Belgium a law prohibiting the bundling of a network service contract with a mobile handset has even been ruled 
illegal by the European Court of Justice as violating the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005/29/EC. 
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demand for communications in foreign countries may keep with SIM-locked mobile handsets.” 
(Knieps and Zenhausern, 2014, pg 77).  
Evidently, the success of carrier portability is predicated on consumers having well-calibrated 
beliefs about their future roaming usage, having a constant discount rate (otherwise preferences 
may be time-inconsistent), and having the capability to integrate future probabilistic roaming 
costs into the decision. The considerable complexity of this decision makes it the sort that only 
homo economicus could grapple with successfully.  While carrier portability may have an 
important role in the future of roaming, placing the burden of responsibility for its success on the 
average consumer may not be prudent given the behavioural evidence that demonstrates the 
limits of this approach. 
 
 
Section 6: Discussion and Conclusion 
        “It is competition, and not competitors, that should be protected. Ultimately, the aim is to 
avoid consumer harm.” (Kroes, 2008). 
The task of delineating competition policy issues from issues of consumer protection issues is 
not straightforward. The above quote from the former EU Competition Commissioner shows that 
the two are inextricably linked. The BIO models reviewed in this paper show that when a 
product has multiple features – some of which are hidden – a firm’s profit maximising strategy 
may entail exploitation of a biased group of consumers to the benefit of another group. The EU 
guidelines on how firms with market power should act to avoid falling foul of EU competition 
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rules32 states that “Conduct which is directly exploitative of consumers, for example charging 
excessively high prices or certain behaviour that undermines the efforts to achieve an integrated 
internal market, is also liable to infringe Article 82”.33 Does a strategy of shrouding or deliberate 
price obfuscation run the risk of infringing this provision if only a subset of consumers is 
exploited? Are such strategies in keeping with the spirit of the law, that firms “do not exclude 
their competitors by other means than competing on the merits of the products or services they 
provide”?34 These are open questions of considerable import to the functioning of a genuine 
internal market. To move towards a more nuanced and realistic understanding of what constitutes 
market power (i.e. a dominant position) and how such a position might be abused, this paper has 
called for the inclusion of BIO models in competition policy.  
How might the policy cycle of the Roaming Regulation have looked had BIO models been (i) 
available at the time and (ii) utilised? At the outset, when determining whether there individual 
or joint dominance was present in the market, policymakers may have investigated whether 
exceptions to the market share criterion applied. This might have taken the form of experimental 
tests to determine the capability of consumers to identify the best value product. Being able to do 
so, and thus exert demand substitution as a competitive constraint, is a prerequisite for effective 
competition. Such tests may have also shed light on which bias was the primary driver of the 
‘bill-shock’ that consumers experienced before the introduction of the Roaming Regulation. 
Alternative interventions, such as roaming being free up to a certain usage limit and opt-in 
thereafter, or a flat fee for roaming, may have presented themselves as more suitable alternatives 
as a result of this testing, though naturally this is only conjecture. The essential point is that BIO 
32 EU Commission Enforcement Priorities on Abuse of a Dominant Position 
33 Ibid, para 7 
34 Ibid, para 6 
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models could have plausibly motivated policymakers to investigate the causes of the observed 
problem on the consumer side in a more systematic manner. And whichever intervention was 
deemed most appropriate, reference to BIO models would have helped rebut the assertion by 
opponents to any intervention in retail markets that forces of supply and demand would improve 
outcomes for consumers in the usual way. 
This paper first highlighted the behavioural components in the problem of bill-shock that are 
common to many markets, to counteract the perception of the Roaming Regulation as an 
exceptional case. Inattention, overconfidence and self-control problems emerge in many markets, 
such as credit cards. On these grounds it was posited that the Roaming Regulation is 
‘behaviourally aligned’. Such classification may allow advocates of consumer protection 
measures going beyond the information paradigm in other markets to use it as a reference case 
where appropriate. The alternative is it being cordoned off as an exceptional measure passed 
through sheer force of political will.  
When consumers do not act like but rather display biases such as inattention, overconfidence and 
self-control problems, and firms sell a product with multiple features, the presence of multiple 
sellers does not ensure genuine competition with upward pressure on quality and downward 
pressure on prices. This is the main message of BIO models. The central importance of ‘demand 
substitution’ within EU competition law means there is a case for targeted laboratory testing of 
consumer capabilities to compare products. A counterfactual examination of two junctures in the 
Roaming Regulation illustrated that the standard model of competition is not always the most 
suitable for determining whether a policy intervention is necessary.  
A valid concern on the introduction of the Roaming Regulation was that the underlying problem 
had not been formulated in the language of competition economics (Sutherland, 2008). This 
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paper has argued that standard competition economics did not have the vocabulary to fully 
articulate the problem. Partly for this reason, the rationale to justify the Roaming Regulation 
used inductive logic to an extent that is not in keeping with the deductive norms of competition 
policy. The introduction of BIO models may provide a way to analyse and resolve such matters 
in a deductively sound manner, and more generally, prove conducive to the formation of 
evidence-based policy. 
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